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Abstract
We study endogenous uncertainty stemming from the introduction of new financial
assets, so as to evaluate the risks as well as the welfare gains of financial innovation. The
introduction of financial assets to hedge individual risk can lead to the risk of default, which is
a collective risk. The possibility of default represents endogenous uncertainty, since it depends
on economic variables. A proper allocation of risk in the face of new states of endogenous
uncertainty requires the introduction of a large number of additional new securities, without
which the market is incomplete. We prove the existence of a general equilibrium with default,
in which the agents recontract trading positions and prices in the states of default (Theorem 1).
We establish the existence of an open set of general equilibrium economies, called complex
economies, in which the pattern of trade is highly interconnected so that default by one agent
leads to default by an overwhelming majority of all other individuals (Theorem 2). We exhibit
examples of complex economies in which the expected amount of default increases with the
population (Proposition 3, Examples 3, and 4).
JEL Classification Numbers: G14, D50, G33
Key words: Collective risk, default, endogenous uncertainty, individual risk, insurance,
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1. Introduction
The welfare gains from financial innovation should be evaluated together with the
posssible increases in financial instability, measured by the probability of widespread default.
This is of interest in economies in which new financial instruments are introduced rapidly, and
where the possibility of increasing the correlation of risks is therefore also significant. Most
industrial economies fit this characteristic at present. Our purpose is to introduce a framework
of analysis to describe rigourously the added uncertainty from financial innovation. For this we
must define and explore a different type of uncertainty than is usually defined within general
equilibrium models of markets, namely endogenous uncertainty: this refers to uncertainty
which depends on economic behaviour along with nature's moves. In addition, it is useful to
combine the notions of individual and collective risk; we shall argue that assets introduced to
hedge individual risk often increase collective risk.
Risk and economic behaviour are closely linked. The complexity of the web of trades
within a market can transmit individual risks and amplify them into collective risks. For
example, a creditor in one market where payment fails to occur may be deprived of the means
of delivery in another market where s/he is a debtor, thereby causing a further default in some
other market, etc. . Therefore default by one individual may lead, through a web of
obligations, to default by a large number of individuals, namely to a collective risk. The risk of
such widespread default can be called endogenous because it depends on economic
behaviour2. Furthermore the transmission of default from one trader to another and from one
market to another is intrinsically a general equilibrium phenomenon. We formalize here
endogenous uncertainty stemming from financial innovation within a general equilibrium
framework. Endogenous uncertainty is represented by new states where there is default on
contracts, either for the trading of the new asset or for the trading of commodities. These states
2
 The term endogenous uncertainty was introduced by Kurz (1974) in a very interesting
discussion of models where uncertainty depends on economic behavior. Endogenous
uncertainty is discussed further in Section 2.
of default emerge only after a new asset is introduced, and may involve a large number of
individual agents. These states represent endogenous uncertainty because they depend on the
diffusion of default throughout the economy and on the patterns of net trades, which cannot be
predicted with certainty. These states represent collective risks because it affects a large
number of agents.
In a world of rapid financial innovation it is important to analyse whether new financial
assets can lead not only to welfare gains but also to endogenous uncertainty of default. We
study a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets where default occurs as new assets
are introduced, and prove existence of an market equilibrium with default. We examine the
types of assets which lead to default, and the asymptotic behaviour of the economy as it
increases in size. We show robust examples of economies where the expected level of default
increases with the size of each (finite) economy, although at the limit, by the law of large
numbers, there is no default. This suggests a "discontinuity at infinity" , which is formalized in
Section 6, and which depends on the relationship between individual and collective risk and on
the degreee of trading complexity of the economy.
A first step is to show how default can emerge following the introduction of new
asssets. A natural framework is an economy where agents face individual risks, for example,
illness or death. Default emerges naturally when assets are defined in terms of statistics rather
than state by state. Such assets are typical of large economies, where it is difficult or costly to
identify individual's characteristics and states. Default is therefore a typical problem in large
economies with individual risks, since in such economies it is standard to use statistics to
describe the characteristics of a group. For example, in Malinvaud's model (1972,1973), the
statistic in question is the expected number of people in one state (such as illness), while the
random variable itself is the actual number of sick people in each realization.
An Arrow - Debreu market has contracts contingent on each actual realization of the
list of sick people. Such contracts, or the corresponding Arrow securities, are necessary for the
efficiency of the competitive equilibrium. If, instead, we value insurance contracts at their
expected value (perhaps plus a premium), actions are taken contingent on a statistic, the
expected value of the loss produced by sickness. As the population increases, the law of large
numbers predicts that the random variable representing the number of sick people converges to
a fixed number with certainty. Therefore in the limit, but only in the limit, selling insurance at
its expected value matches premia precisely to the insurance payments to be made.
However close we are to the limit, if we are not actually there, the law of large
numbers may not operate exactly. This means that insurance contracts designed to deal with
an exact proportion of sick people will not be able to cope with the actual payments in those
cases where the realized numbers exceed the limiting proportions. Therefore, with small but
positive probabilities, contracts will default. In other words, insurance contracts offered at
actuarially fair values promise payments that can exceed physical endowments.
Once default occurs, the complexity of the webs of trades within the economy will
determine how widely it spreads, and the total amount defaulted. We analyze the effects of
introducing certain assets, called Arrow - Lind - Malinvaud (ALM) assets, which are motivated
by earlier work of Arrow and Lind (1970), and Malinvaud (1972, 1973)3. These are assets
which are defined in terms of statistics, rather than contingent on each possible social state,
and priced as a function of their expected value, such as actuarially fair insurance contracts for
individual risks. These assets exist in practice because of the inherent difficulties of dealing
with contracts contingent on exhaustive lists of all individual states. We show that the
introduction of these assets leads to new states of collective endogenous risk, each described
by a level of default of the asset. This default leads, in turn, to a chain reaction of defaults and
recontracting of quantities and prices in all markets.
A widely known and interesting set of examples of Arrow - Lind - Malinvaud (ALM)
assets is provided in Arrow and Lind (1970)4. They are provided by shareholding of firms
3
 See Duffie (1990) for a survey of financial innovation in other kinds of financial assets.
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 Another practical example is given by assets such as bonds which are evaluated on the basis
of credit rankings, which provide expected default levels over a class of individuals. Any plan
contingent on the value of such assets is prone to default, unless we are already in the limiting
which maximize expected profits. Arrow and Lind argue that expected profit is the preferred
maximand in economies with individual risk, and point out that most risks in economic
decisions are indeed of this type. When expected profits is the basis for decision making, we
have statistical rather than contingent decisions. This leads again to default possibilities. The
shareholders in a firm which maximizes expected profits must default their obligations in those
states where the firm's profits (and thus the shareholders' wealth) fall short of what is expected.
Our model can be applied to a more general framework than Malinvaud's model of individual
risk. We consider more generally Arrow - Lind - Malinvaud (ALM) assets: these are assets
which are defined as a function of their expected value (or of any other statistic) rather than on
a state contingent basis.
Section 2 discusses the concept of endogenous uncertainty. The general equilibrium
framework of individual and collective risk is formulated in Section 3. Theorem 1 in Section 4
proves the existence of a general equilibrium with default when agents recontract trades and
prices in the default states. These default states are new, as they only exist following the
introduction of the ALM asset. Each of the new states represents endogenous uncertainty.
Therefore we arrive at a formalization of the concept of endogenous uncertainty within a
general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets.
It is well known that default arises for many reasons, and several explanations and
formalizations have been proposed recently (e.g. Dubey, Shubik and Geanakoplos (1989),
Dubey and Geanakoplos (1989), Zame (1990)). But however it is initiated, Theorem 2 in
Section 5 shows that in an open set of economies called complex economies, it will lead to a
collective state with a large expected value of default no matter how large the economy, i.e. no
matter how close we are to the limiting economy. In other words, a robust set of large but
finite complex economies, there exists a set of collective states with positive probability
each,where the overwhelming majority of the households in the economy default (Theorem 2).
economy and thus a proportion of individuals defaulting is equal to the expected value.
They define new endogenous states of collective uncertainty, and require in turn the
introduction of new securities to complete the market and obtain efficient allocations.5 The
diffusion of default in complex economies has an effect akin to a "multiplier", and has policy
implications similar to those usually attributed to economies with multiplier effects.6 A policy
which succeeds in stopping default by one agent will multiply its benefits, as it will prevent
further default by a large number of other agents without additional costs.
Propositions 3, Examples 3 and 4 in Section 6 establish that the expected value of
default may exceed any bound as the population increases, no matter how close the economy
is to its limit, and that default per capita may increase as well with the population size. Since
in the limit, with infinite populations, there is no default, this indicates a "discontinuity at
infinity", which we formalize in Section 6. We provide examples of general equilibrium
economies illustrating our conditions and results. A conclusion in Section 7 summarizes the
results.
2. Endogenous Uncertainty and Default
A sharpening of the concept of risk is offered here to give a formal account of how
endogenous uncertainty and default occur. Uncertainty is generally represented by random
variables. Each realization of a random variable is called a state.
Collective states are realizations of random variables that affect all individuals of the
5
 Cass, Chichilnisky and Wu (1991) explores how many assets, and of what type, are needed to
reach Pareto efficient allocations under certain assumptions on the relation between individual
and collective risk, namely when individual uncertainty is defined conditional on aggregate
collective risks.
6
 Our results share a commonly held view of the problem, exemplified in Geanakoplos (1990)
who writes in another context: "Default is quintessentially a general equilibrium phenomenon.
In a world in which promises can exceed physical endowments, each default can begin a chain
reaction. A creditor in one market where payment does not occur is deprived of the means of
delivery in another market where he/she is a debtor, thereby causing a further default in some
other markte, etc. The indirect effects of default might be as important as the direct effects, but
they are missed in partial equilibrium models. In general equilibrium models with incomplete
markets, both the direct and the indirect effects of default can be captured, and the welfare
implications of default studied."
economy, e.g. bad weather. An individual state is instead a realization of a random variable
that affects one individual in the economy, e.g. the individual's sickness or death.7 In addition,
we introduce here a second classification, between exogenous states, which describe nature's
moves, and endogenous states, which derive from the operation of the economy. Kurz (1974)
introduced the concept of endogenous uncertainty in an interesting discussion about economic
models with uncertainty. Later Svensson (1981), Chichilnisky, Dutta and Heal (1991) and
Henrotte (1992) studied endogenous price uncertainty in a sequential equilibrium framework.
We introduce instead a general equilibrium approach to endogenous uncertainty induced by
financial innovation.
Exogenous collective states describe moves by nature that affect all individuals in the
economy. These are the only type of states considered by Arrow (1953) and Debreu (1959).
Exogenous individual states are also nature's moves, but they affect only one individual, e.g.
illness or death. These are the states considered in Arrow and Lind (1970) and Malinvaud
(1972,1973).
We now turn to endogenous states. An endogenous state is an event which is described
by a combination of values of exogenous and endogenous variables of the model, and which
cannot be controlled or predicted with probability one by the agents of the economy. The
definition of an endogenous state depends therefore on the model and on its informational
structure. For example, with perfect foresight about prices, the set of all equilibrium prices of
an economy is not an endogenous state, since it can be predicted. However, each of the
equilibrium prices of an economy with more than one equilibrium and with perfect foresight is
an endogenous state, if the agents of the economy are unable to predict precisely which
equilibrium will be realized (see also Chichilnisky, Dutta and Heal (1991), Dasgupta and Heal
(1979, p. 416 - 417), Hahn (1991) and Chichilnisky, Heal, Swinkles and Streufert (1991)).
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 The definition of individual risk also requires that the proportion of all individuals in each
state converges with certainty to a fixed proportion when the number of individuals goes to
infinity; this is defined later in this section.
Another instance of endogenous risk is exemplified in the concept of "moral hazard".8
Consider a large economy with individual risks, as in Malinvaud (1972,1973). Then the
law of large numbers tells us that there is asymptotically no uncertainty about the proportion
of individuals in each state: as the population grows, the proportion of people in each state
converges to a known number, which equals the probability of one individual being in that
state. This principle is utilized in pricing statistical assets such as insurance contracts. But
convergence to the limit could be slow, and no matter how close the economy is to its limit,
the economy could differ significantly from its limiting behaviour.
We observe that the law of large numbers may be defeated in practical terms by the
complexity of the economy. A complex economy is an economy where failure to deliver on a
contract by one individual leads to the same type of failure by all other individuals. An
economy is k - complex, or has complexity k when failure to deliver on a contract by any one
agent leads to such failures by k agents in the economy. This paper argues that the complexity
of an economy amplifies and transmits risks, transforming exogenous individual asks into
endogenous collective risks. When states of default are predicted, rational individuals will
make decisions contingent on each such state, and recontract prices and quantities to stay
within their new budgets in each state (taking into account the defaults). This leads to an
incomplete market with as many new states and new budget constraints as states of default, an
economy which requires as many new assets (Arrow securities) as states of default to reach
efficiency.
Additionally, the large number of the states of default and the difficulty in collecting
largely individual data, may defeat the exhaustive treatment of contingent markets called for
by Arrow and Debreu to reach efficiency. Thus new ALM assets may be introduced, assets
8
 This is utually studied in a partial equilibrium framework (Arrow , 1963). Here again the
risks depend jointly on exogenous data and also on rational actions taken by the agents (Pauly,
1968), except that the informational structure is assumed to be asymetric. The agent knows
his/her true state, the insurer may not. Examples where the introduction of an aset can increase
the risk of moral hazard have been studied recently in Amott and Stiglitz (1990).
which lead, in turn, to the same type of default. Thus in complex economies, the problem of
collective default may emerge anew with every new set of ALM securities introduced to deal
with the default of the previous set of securities. The complexity of the economy implies that,
whenever default occurs, and for whatever reason, it is amplified as the population grows,
because the trading patterns are highly interlinked.
3. Individual and Collective Risk
This section summarizes and extends Malinvaud's (1972, 1973) model of insurance for
individual risk, and discusses its connection with the Arrow - Debreu model. Both models are
used subsequently as benchmarks in the definition of our model, which contains both
exogenous and endogenous uncertainty, and each of them has individual and collective aspects.
Arrow (1953) and Debreu (1959) consider economies with collective risks: these are
risks shared by all agents in the economy, such as the weather. Efficient allocations are
achieved when there exist competitive markets for all commodities contingent on all states of
nature. Arrow and Lind (1970) introduce the concept of individual risk, which they consider
the most common risk encountered in economic decision. These are risks which are peculiar
to one individual only, such as sickness or death.9 Malinvaud (1972, 1973) formalizes
individual risk in a general equilibrium model. In this context, he proves that in large
economies10 the only assets needed for the asymptotic efficiency of markets are insurance
contracts for individual risk. The saving in the number of transactions and in the information
required is considerable. For example, with N goods and H individuals in two states (health or
9
 As an example of its wide application, the study of individual risk also underlies the theory
of banking. In Diamond and Dybvig (1983) the banks, by offering demand deposit contracts,
provide insurance against liquidity shocks to individuals and help achieve efficient risk
allocations.
10
 Malinvaud's results are asymptotic: they hold for the limit of a sequence of economies with
increasingly large populations. In each finite economy the expected excess demand is zero, but
excess demand need not be zero in all states. In Section 3.c we exend this model to a limiting
economy with infinitely many individuals of several types, in which excess demand is always
exactly zero.
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sick) efficiency requires N2 contingent markets, which increases exponentially with H.11
Instead, only N spot markets and one insurance contract per individual type suffices for
asymptotic efficiency.12
Another practical advantage of insurance for individual risk is highlighted by the
informational difficulty involved in trading Arrow - Debreu contingent contracts in a large
economy. These contracts must be contingent on a large number of individual characteristics
and states. For example, individuals must be able to purchase insurance contracts contingent
on whether a long list of all others individuals in the economy are sick or well. Such would be
the impractical nature of the Arrow - Debreu contracts or the Arrow securities needed for
efficiency in an economy with individual risk. Insurance contracts, instead, depend solely on
the individual's state. The efficiency of markets with individual insurance relies crucially on
the limiting behavior of the distribution of states across the economy. As populations increase,
the limiting proportion of people in each state (e.g. sick or healthy) is a fixed number about
which there is no uncertainty. This is part of the definition of individual risk in Malinvaud
(1973) who considers identical but not necessarily independent individual risk.
An extreme case of individual risk is provided by identically distributed and
independent (iid) random variables.13 With iid's there is no connection between the individuals'
risks; furthermore, the probability of a collective state (e.g. how many people are ill) is
derived, indeed defined from, the probability of each individual's risks. Instead, Arrow -
Debreu's approach to uncertainty described by "states of nature" is an extreme case of
11
 Or, following Arrow (1953, 1964) N spot markets and 2 Arrow securities, a number which
still increases exponentially with the numberof individuals, H.
12
 See Section 3.b below. Malinvaud's (1972, 73) results hold for economies where all agents
are identical. We extend his model to include several types of agents, in wich case one
insurance contract is needed for each type. Agents types are identified by their preferences,
probabilities and endowments, which vary across individual states. All markets for collective
risk are assumed to be described by the existing N commodity markets; in this sense
Malinvaud (1973) considers (exogenous) collective risks as well, but assumes that all markets
for the optimal allocation of collective risks exist.
13
 With i.i.d's,the limiting proportions of such individuals in one state equals the probability of
one individual being in that state.
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collective risk. In Arrow - Debreu models all risk is collective, and the probability distribution
of risks for one individual is derived from, indeed is identical to the distribution for collective
risks, because all individuals are exposed to the same risks simultaneously. However, between
these two extreme cases there are many shades of risks which combine in different ways
features of individual and collective risks. They are represented by random variables which
have individual and collective components simultaneously. For example, a communicable
disease is an individual risk which has also collective risks features. Another case where
individual and collective risks are mixed appears in Cass, Chichilnisky and Wu (1991), which
explores markets where individual risks, namely who will be affected, can be defined to be
conditional on aggregte collective uncertainty, namely how many people will be affected.
Chichilnisky and Heal (1992) explore another case where individual risks are unknown; even
when there are no collective risks, ignorance about individual risks is shown to lead to
collective uncertainty. The latter two papers study the markets which suffice to attain Pareto
efficient allocations under specific conditions on the connection between collective and
individual uncertainty. The definition of individual risk (see Malinvaud (1972, 1973), and
below) implies that as the population increases the collective risk, defined by the proportion of
people affected, dissapears in the limit: with infinite populations, there is no such collective
risk. In the limit there is no uncertainty about the distribution of risks across the population:
this is known with certainty. However, with finite populations there is always potential mix of
individual and collective risks.
In this paper we explore an important case where individual and collective risks are
simultaneously determined, and the connection between individual and collective risks is
mediated through economic behavior. We assume that the economy is large but finite.
Therefore exhaustive lists of individual states are difficult to be included in contracts, so that
assets promise payments contingent on statistics rather than state - by - state. This is shown to
lead to new states of default. The complexity of trading in the economy transmits and enlarges
this risk into states of collective default. Thus the introduction of assets to deal with individual
12
risks lead to more collective risks. Although the individual risks are exogenous, depending on
states of nature, the new collective risks are endogenous, depending on economic behaviour
such as how many agents default on their contracts. We may summarize this by the
observation that assets introduced to deal with exogenous individual risks imply new
endogenous collective risks. A representation is as shown in Figure 1 below:
Figure 1 goes here
A benchmark model for economies with individual risk is Malinvaud's (1972, 1973),
where all agents are identical. Here we extend his model to include several types of agents,
identified by their endowments, utilities and probabilities. First we establish the notation.
Consider an exchange economy with N consumption goods, with the Nth good as the
numeraire (pN = 1). There are H households, divided into types indexed by i = 1,...,I, and H.
households of type i, so that H = I. H-. Each household faces the same set of S individual
states, indexed by s = 1,...,S. Let Q denote the set of collective states, Cl = { o: a is a function
from {1,...,H} into {1,...,S}}. Cl consists of all possible lists of the individual states for the H
IT
individuals, and it has S elements. Let s(h,o) be the individual state given by the h-th
component of the collective state o~, and r. (o~) be the proportion of all households of type i for
S
whom s(h,a) = s. Then I * r. (or) = 1. Let r.(o) = (r.,((7),...,r.c((7)) be the vector of these
S—1 IS 1 11 Id
proportions of households of type i among S individual states for any given collective state o.
Then r.(o) e A, the S-l - dimensional simplex. Similarly let r(o) be the proportion of
households of all types for a given collective state, r(o) = (r1(o),..,rT(a)) e A . Let RTT be the
set of vectors r(a) when a runs over Q ; then r(o) e RTT is called an aggregate collective state
because it is defined only by the total number of individuals in each state for each type, and
does not contain any information about the identities of the individuals themselves. RTT is
r H.+S-l
contained in A and has A = IL( P I ) elements. Let IT be the probability of the collective
state a. II(r) is the probability of the aggregate collective state r. The following anonymity
13
assumption is required for identical risk faced by all individuals:
r(<7) = T(&) implies II = II .,
Malinvaud (1973, p. 387) establishes that the probability that an aggregate collective state r
obtains and that simultaneously, for a given household h of type i, a particular state s also
obtains is II(r) r. .The probability p. that, for a given h of type i, a particular individual state
s obtains is therefore given by
o> — X Ilfr) r.Kis reRTT v ' is*
Note that the probability FI(r) on RJT is quite arbitrary. There is no assumption that
individual risks are independent. However, we assume that as H -» « the probability distribution
on Rrr converges to a definitive limit supported at one point of A . If this is not satisfied, we
may say that the risks involved have a collective component. Formally, denote now the
probability distribution of R^ by nTj(r) to indicate its dependence on the size of the
population, H. Then the concept of individual risk means that in the limit the proportion r . of
type i individuals in state s, is fixed with probability one.
Definition: An economy is said to have individual risk if as H -> °°, n ^ r ) -* II (r)
where n°°(r) is a point distribution on A namely n°°is a degenerate distribution concentrated
on one point r e A , U (r ) = 1.
The definition of individual risk provided here is from Malinvaud (1972, 1973); it does
not require that the individual probabilities be identically and independently distributed (iid)
random variables, although iid's certainly satisfy our definition of individual risk. This
definition (the same as Malinvaud's (1973)) allows a wide class of populations of random
variables in which correlations may exist between individual's random variables, provided that
as the population increases in size all collective risk dissapears, or, in other words, in the limit
the probability distribution over collective states is supported on a single point.
The von Neumann Morgenstern utility function in terms of collective states o is
(i) w V h )
re RH s=l
14
where z , e R . All households h of type i have the same endowment e1 = e1 in any
aggregate collective state r and individual state s, the same probabilities p. for each state s,
is
Kand their von - Neuman Morgenstem utility can also be written in terms of aggregate
collective states r or individual states s:
S
(2) W (Z ) =
or
(3) WV) =
s=l 1O a °i N+
were z e R is the consumption of a household of type i in individual state s, as explained
in Appendix A.
3.a. The Arrow - Debreu model with contingent contracts for individual risk
Consider the set Cl of all collective states a consisting of a realization of one of the S
states for each of the H households in the economy; Q has S elements. The endowments e.
TT
of a household h is an NS dimensional vector. For each household h of type i the
endowment is the same across all collective states in Q in which h is at the same individual
XJ
state s. A price vector p is an NS dimensional vector. An Arrow - Debreu equilibrium is
* H
a price vector p* and H consumption plans z , with NS components each, such that if
* i
individual h is of type i, z . maximizes W (z.) subject to
(4) p*(zh- eh) = 0
and markets clear:
H
(5) X (z*h - eh) = 0.
h = l
3.b. Malinvaud's model with Insurance for Individual Risk.
15
and Arrow - Lind - Malinvafld assets.
Malinvaud notes that the number of contingent markets in the Arrow - Debreu model is
IT
impossibly high, indeed equal to NS (an exponential function of the number of individuals).
He furthermore notes that as the population increases, then in the limit all contracts contingent
on collective states become irrelevant. This is because with probability one, all collective
states become equal, with probability one, to the single aggregate collective state r°° having a
fixed proportion r of people of each type i in each individual state s. Since the total initial
endowments in the economy and total number of people with a given preference are fixed, this
Nleads to a fixed set of prices for the N commodities, p e R (Malinvaud (1973), Proposition
5). For this reason, he suggests that, as the number of individuals goes to infinity: "The
economy should be able to work properly with just N markets, one for each good" (Malinvaud
(1973),p.401). This requires, however, that individuals should be able to hedge appropriately
their risk between bad and good individual states. For this purpose, Malinvaud introduces
individual insurance: contingent commodities are substituted by an insurance system operating
as a redistribution scheme. Suppose that the individual of type i holds insurance contracts that
will give him or her the net transfer v1 of the numeraire good if he or she is in state s. Let
i N
now z , e R be the consumption vector by individual h of type i of the N goods in state s.
NThen if p e R is the vector of (sure) commodity prices, the individual of type i has a budget
constraint:
(6) p(z's - e'p = v1^ (s = 1.....S)
Risk coverage means that v1 will be positive in unfavorable states and correspondingly
negative in favorable states. The individual chooses net transfers v1 , depending on the terms
on which such insurance contracts are offered. Malinvaud assumes that a transfer vector v1 is
accessible to individual h of type i if and only if it is actuarially fair, i.e. its expected value is
zero14:
14
 This differs from the concept of "mutual insurance", see Cass, Chichilnisky and Wu (1991) in
which the payoff is dependent on the individual state and also on the collective state. For
16
(7) Z P{/s = 0.
s=l 1S s
This is admittedly a strong assumption, but we note that nothing in what follows
changes if instead the expected value is equal to a constant c > 0, where c could be the return
on investment across the economy in equilibrium, or a regulated level of profits. This
assumption could be formalized as an equilibrium condition on the supply of insurance.15
Arrow and Lind (1970) proposed that the expected profit should be the preferred maximand for
public firms in economies with individual risks, and indeed share holding in such firms would
also be assets valued as a function of their expected value. With these applications in mind,
we consider more generally any asset which is offered at a price which is a function of its
expected value, and we call this an Arrow - Tjnd - Ma^nvaud (ALM assetV The introduction
of such an asset has the effect of modifying the right hand side of equation (7) leading to
S
(8) i/^
s=l 1S s l
Malinvauri'^ equilibrium I L , with insurance for individual risk and several types of agents16 is
defined as a vector of prices p* e R , and for each household of type i = 1,...,I, a plan
" sic TW.T *




and expected total excess demand £(p) is zero17:
example, a mutual health insurance will make payments to an ill individual which depend on
how many other people are ill.
15
 This could be formalized as a market clearing condition for Arrow - Lind - Malinvaud firms
which maximize expected profits: assets with positive value would result in an infinite
demand, while assets with negative expected value result in infinite supply.
16
 This is Malinvaud's (1973) market organization type C, extended here to include several type
of individuals.
17
 Note that excess demand may not be zero at some aggregate collective state r.
17
ftp*) = £ . H.^ (p*) = X H.1 1
 A I
(10) ftp*) = £ . H.^ (p*) = X H. Zp^z 1 * - e1 ) = 0.
1 1
 A I s = 1 is s s
When the right hand side of equation (9) is substituted by c- as in (8), then we call this
an equilibrium with individual risk and Arrow - Linj - Malinvaunf (AI'M) assets. Related
concepts of equilibrium with zero expected excess demand have been studied by Hildenbrand
(1971) and Wu (1988).
3.c. An infinite number of households of each type
Assume now that that there are infinitely many individuals of each type i. Then by the
assumption of individual risk, p. = r°°- , where r°° e A is the support of the limiting
I!) Xo
probability n namely the (unique) limiting aggregate collective state giving a fixed
proportion r . is of individuals of type i which are in individual state s. Per capita expected
excess demand (1/H)< (^p) is now used instead of excess demand because the latter may not be a
finite number in the limit, as H -» «. The equilibrium condition is now therefore written as
(11) (1/H)ftp)= 0 almost surely.
The assumption of individual risk and (11) imply that the limit of per capita excess
demand as the number of individuals H increases, is zero almost surely. In the limit there is
no default, since the proportion of people in an individual state s within an aggregated
collective state r is exactly r°°. = p This limiting economy is denoted E^°°. The Pareto
is'
optimality of the allocations in E°V, is established in Malinvaud (1973).
4. Default with Incomplete Markets
This section formalizes a finite general equilibrium economy E with insurance and
default using Malinvaud's model defined on Section 3 as a benchmark. As already noted, in a
large but finite Malinvaud economy E M extended to include several agent types, excess
demand may fail to be zero at some aggregate collective state r e RTT of positive probability,
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because there are states r where promises exceed physical constraints. Similarly, there are
states r where the insurer may fail to deliver on its contracts. The purpose of this section is to
formalize such defaults within the equilibrium of a new (finite) economy E at which excess
demand is zero in each state r e R^.
Let A be the cardinality of the set of aggregate collective states R (Section 3). If r°° is
the limiting aggregate collective state which exists by definition of individual risk, then we
shall assume that the population size H is a multiple of l/r°°. for all i,s with r • * 0, so that
is is
there exists an aggregate collective state r in the finite economy E with r. = r . for all i,s.
NAFor each price vector p e R , and r € RTT, the aggregate vector of (exact) excess demand per
capita is:
S
(12) Xp) = Z (H./H) feO
r
 i x s=l 1S s r
where r. is the proportion of individuals of type i in the individual state s within r, and £ (p)
is the excess demand of the h household of type i in collective state r and individual state s,
derived from maximizing the utility function (2) over the set of y1 satisfying p(y - e1 ) =
Si oi IS
v1 . The difference between the expected per capita excess demand in (11), and the actual
excess demand vector per capita in state r in (12) is
(13) /3r(p) = (1/H)§(p) - ^(p) ,
which may have positive or a negative coordinates. We say that there is individual default in
state r at equilibrium prices p if some coordinate of the aggregate excess demand
I- H-r. (t;1 (p)) is strictly positive; r is then called a state of individual default The set of all
individual default states is denoted XF.
Similarly for each r the difference between the receipts from insurance payments, and
the total premia collected is:
(14) D(r) = I . s Hj r{/s,
where v1 is the transfer received by household of type i in individual state s. Any r where D(r)
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> 0 is a state of insurance default18, and D(r) is the insurance default in state r. The set of
insurance default states is denoted V. We also write T H and D H to indicate their dependence
on the population size H. The probability of the set V of states r on which D(r) > 0, tends to
zero as the population increases, i.e. lim
 H ^ J ^ G ^ ) ) = 0.19 Let V be the union of the sets T
and XF. This set is called the set of default states.
We formalize below the assumption of limited liability on the part of the insurer: when
default occurs, the actual insurance payments are made proportionally to what is owed. There
are I insurance contracts, S - dimensional vectors of transfers (v1 ), one such vector for each
type of individual, i. We assume that there is no difficulty in identifying individual types. The
insurer may have positive profits in some states (D(r) < 0). The insurer is a (private or public)
company; its owners share a utility function W (zr) = ^ R ^ U C z p which is risk neutral (or
which is as in (2)), and an initial endowments e, the same in all states.
We formalize below the assumption that at each default state r e V, individuals
recontract with each other, so that new net trades and market clearing prices emerge at each
default state.
The informational structure of the model is as follows. Privacy is preserved, in the
sense that individuals know their own endowments and preferences but not those of others.
Individuals anticipate accurately that there is default in states r e V, and also the extent of
default and decrease in their insurance payments in such collective states. For any state of
default r e V, and for each individual state s, define 81 to be the actual change in the
insurance payment (in the numeraire good) to the ith type of household in individual state s
derived from this default policy. Individuals anticipate correctly each 51 and that the value of
18
 Note that if the asset sold is not actualrially fair insurance as defined in (7) above, but rather
a mutual insurance policy, there will be no insurance default, since in that case the insurance
premia always match the payments, see for example the definition of mutual insurance
contracts in Cass, Chichilnisky and Wu (1991).
19
 Note that the sum of default in the economy may or not go to zero with H depending on how
many other defaults are precipitated by the default in insurance payments and on the rate of
convergence of IUT as H -> «, see Theorem 2 and Propisitions 3,4, and 5 below.
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their consumption in such states does not exceed the value of their endowment plus the
(reduced) insurance payments received. Then an individual's income is now contingent on the
aggregate collective state of the economy, r. Therefore A more states are now introduced (A is
the cardinality of the set R) in the (extended) Malinvaud economy. With perfect foresight,
NAtherefore, we now have NA markets. A price p is now a vector in R . A consumption plan
i N i
y for household h of type i consists of SA consumption vectors in R denoted y , one for
each aggregate collective state r e R, and individual state s. Recall that the insurance contracts
provide transfers v1 with L p . v1 = 0 in all no - default states. The data of the model, known
d O Xo O
to all the households, include now the probabilities n of all aggregate collective states r e R ,
in particular those of the default states r e V, and also the shortfalls 8l < 0 , s=l,...,S, on the
payment to the h household of type i at the aggregate collective state r. Note that with perfect
foresight, the ALM asset with payoff vector (v1,,...^1^), i = 1,...,I, ceases to be a statistical
asset and becomes a state contingent contract for the insured. This is because the insured is
now aware of the contingent payment v1 + 51 in all the collective states r in which there is
o oX
default, r e P.
A general equilibrium with default is defined as follows. With H households of I types,
NAthe equilibrium consists of a vector p* of prices in R , for each household h of type i, S.A
i* N
consumption vectors y in R representing consumption in the aggregate collective state r
* N
and individual state s, and A vectors y € R representing consumption by the insurer in
aggregate collective state r, such that the vector y = (y J maximizes the utility function20
oX
s
(2) W (y ) =
r e R R x s=l " " Oi
on the set of y1 = (y^J satisfying
(15) p (y1 - e1 ) = v1 , and I p. v1 = 0, s= 1,...,S, if r i
(budget balance in states with no insurance default).
20
 This is the utility function defined in (2) above, and discussed in Appendix A.
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and
(6) p * r ( y i s r s s r s
(budget balance for insurance default states)
* *
The vector y = (y ) maximizes the utility function
(17)
reR
on the set of y = (y ) satisfying
(18) P > r - e > = £ i , s i i s s
(budget of the insurer in non - default states)
or
(19) p* r(y r-e) = c, c<02i , i f r e T
(budget of the insurer in default states)
and, for each aggregate collective state r e R ,
S
(20) ZHX
(excess demand equals zero).
The Asset Structure of the economy E
In order to make explicit the asset structure of the model, we define the aggregate
collective states as follows:
r 6 F (insurance default states) = {1,...,V}
and assume for simplicity in the exposition that there is one r without default,
r = 0 (the no - insurance - default state)
So we can write r = 0,l,...,V, or r 6 {0,1,..,V}. The corresponding price vector is p , r =
0,...,V, p e R ^ '. The two budget constraints (15) and (16) can be written as one
21
 The parameter "c" could be considered a penalty levied on the insurer in default statas. The
structure of the equilibrium is the same for c = 0 or c < 0.
22
equation:
(21) p^z 1^ - e^) = S\r + v^ , r = O,1,...,V, s = 1.....S
where 5l = 0 (i.e. when r = 0),
i N i N N i i
z e R , e e R , p € R , 5 and v are scalars. The "a" operation is defined in a
standard fashion:
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(22) P D (z\ ~ O =
s s;
for a given s, where the right hand side of (22) is an (V+l) x 1 matrix. Then equation (21)
can be written:
(23) Dfz1 -e i_) = Zi =
S S s sr
for s = 1,...,S. We can also write (21) more compactly as follows. Let Z =
J11>-»Z1S,...,Z1S]> an (V+l) x S matrix, then (21) is
(24) [p D (z^ - e\),...,v D (z^ - e^),...,? D (z'g - e^)] = Z1






v l s + l 5 l s v
Note that the asset structure of E has restricted access: although there are I
insurance contracts, as many as individual types, a household of type i can only purchase
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insurance contract of type i, i.e. a vector of transfers (v1 ) with l^^py1 = 0. the market is
S Sfc o IS S
incomplete because there are only I assets, while there are as many states as the cardinality of
the set R, namely A (Section 3). At least A - I assets (or Arrow securities) are required to
complete the market, allowing the households to transfer income in all states in R and thus
reach Pareto efficient allocations.
Theorem 1. There exists a general equilibrium with default for the economy E of
incomplete markets.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix B.
The economy E is also denoted ETT to indicate the number of its individuals. Note that
the condition of individual risk implies that as the number of individuals H goes to infinity, the
economy ETT converges to a limiting economy denoted E°°, which is identical to the limit of
the Malinvaud economies E ^ . Formally, linvj _^
 M ETT = E°° = E y,, as defined in Section 3.
Alternatively, if the number of individuals H remains constant but we substitute the
probability distribution FI on R by the singular probability n°° = lim ELr supported on the
00 *
single aggregate collective state r , we obtain an economy E with the same finite number of
individuals (H) but with a unique aggregate collective state r°° almost surely. Then V i,s p. =
00 *
r . . There is no insurance default in E and excess demand is identical to expected excess
Id
* oo
demand almost surely. In per capita terms E is identical to E . There is no collective risk in
00
E because there is only one aggregate collective state r almost surely; all individual risk is
i *
covered by the insurance contracts (v ) which never default. E behaves as E is expected to,
but sometimes doesn't. For this reason E is called a benchmark for E:




This section formalizes and examines the complexity of an economy, i.e. the total
number of individuals who default following any one's default. We aim to determine the extent
to which there is a chain reaction of defaults in an economy where the trade patterns are highly
interlinked. The economy's complexity determines the extent to which there is a "multiplier"
effect for policies designed to prevent financial default.
As already noted, there exist aggregate collective states r in R where the insurer cannot
meet promised payments to individuals, namely when r G P. In the (finite) perfect foresight
economy E, individuals take these defaults into account, and adjust their consumption in state r
appropriately (Section 4, (15)). In Section 4 we defined an abstract economy which we
denoted the benchmark economy E , and which has no default; this economy is constructed
for the purpose of comparing it with E, and measuring default and complexity. E and E are
identical in all respects except on the structure of uncertainty. We could view E as an
idealized economy which functions always as E is expected to function, but sometimes doesn't.
The extent of default in an "unexpected" state of E can then be measured by comparing the
allocation in that state with the allocations at the economy E . We consider default in a state r
e F where the insurer fails to honor its payment v1 to an individual h of type i in individual
state s at a collective state r, and examine how many other individuals default as a
consequence.
Formally, let (z1 J denote an equilibrium allocation in E of an individual h of type i
i* iin individual state s at a collective state r. If its m-component (z - e ) is negative, we say
that h is a net importer of m, or simply an importer of m, at this equilibrium. The same
*
definition with the opposite sign applies to exporters of a good m. Similarly in E individual h
i* i* i
of type i is a net exporter of a good m at the equilibrium allocation (z ), when (z - e ) >
o o 1X1
0, where z is an equilibrium allocation for E . Let r be a default state of the economy E as
defined in Section 4, and for s,r let h be an importer of good m at an equilibrium allocation of
E, (z1 J . Consider an equilibrium (p , z1 ) of E , and an equilibrium allocation (z1 ) of E
oL o ol
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in a state of insurance default r e F .
Default: An importer h of good m in economy E is said to default at s,r when the value of h's
net purchases of good m at the default state r € T is lower than what h contracted to purchase
at the individual state s in E , i.e. |p
 m (z1 sr(m) - e^Cm))! < |p ^ z 1 s(m) - e^m))! .
A similar definition holds for exporters. Note that the values are given by the
*
equilibrium price p* of the benchmark economy E . Default therefore identifies the decrease
in the value of a contract resulting from a failure in payments by the insurer. The complexity
of the economy measures how many other individuals default in state r as a consequence of
the default by the insurer on payments to individuals of type i.
Complexity: The economy E is said to have complexity k at a default state r, when there are k
defaults following any one default, at any equilibrium allocation of E* and E. E is called
complex when its complexity is H.
Note that the concept of default defined here is not related to bilateral trade between
the individuals, nor to sequential trading of any form; default compares two simultaneous
situations, and refers to contracts (net trades) for delivery to the "market exchange" or to an
"auctioneer", as in the Arrow - Debreu market formulation. In other words, no information is
given here about who trades with whom or how much. Such information is explicitly
forbidden by the assumption of preserving privacy. In our context, default involves simply an
equilibrium net trade vector at a default state which differs from that contracted at a no -
default equilibrium.
The concept of complexity and the analysis of complex economies is useful for two
reasons. The first is for gauging the collective nature of the states of default in the economy E
defined in Section 4. For example, in an economy with complexity k > H/2, a default state
involves defaults by a large number of individuals. The default states in E are always
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collective states, because they depend on the number of people in a bad state across the
population. However, the collective nature of these states is emphasized further when the
complexity of the economy if high. In such economies the states of default not only depend
on a collective state (the number of people in a given individual state) but also affect a large
number of individuals as well. This is formalized in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 shows that there exists an open set of economies E with complexity k, for
any k > 2. This establishes that in an open set of economies the states of default affect at least
k individuals. Therefore when k is large, the risk of default cannot be hedged properly by
insurance.
Consider now an economy E with N goods, H individuals of I different types. There are
S individual states. Each individual of type i has an endowment e1 and a utility as in (2) and
W (Section 4, (17)). In addition, an S vector of transfers (v1 ) is available to each individual of
type i provided it has zero expected value, as in (7). The economy can be described therefore
as E = (N, H, I, e , W1, W). Insurance contracts do not appear in this parameterization, since
they are chosen as an optimal set of transfers (v1 ), s=l,...,S, by the individuals of type i,
among all possible transfers of zero expected value. The space E of all such economies can be
parameterized by the endowments {e1 } e R and by the utilities W1, i= 1,...,I, and W, and
topologized by the product topology T defined by the Euclidean metric on endowments and the
2 2
Whitney C topology on the space of C utility functions. The Whitney topology on the space
of C functions U :R -» R is defined by specifying neighborhoods of zero, since this is a
linear space (Smale (1974), Peixoto (1967)). Such a neighborhood M^ is defined by each
strictly positive continuous function f: R -» R as follows: the function U e Vr iff ||U(x)|| <
f(x), ||DU(x)|| < f(x), ||D (U(x)|| <f(x) for all x e RN where DU and D^J are the first and
second derivatives of U, and ||.|| is the Euclidean norm in finite dimensional spaces. An open
set of economies in the space E means an open set in the topology T, as endowments and
utilities vary.
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Theorem 2. Let N > H. and k > 2. There exists in E an open set of economies of
complexity k.
Proof of Theorem 2 is in Appendix B.
The following corollary refers to small variations of the endowments of the economy, leaving
utilities invariant. The set of economies is now parameterized by its endowments and these
are endowed with any bounded measure which is positive on open sets:
Corollary 1: Let N > H. and k < H. Then there exists a set of positive measure of
Arrow - Debreu economies which are k - complex, for any default level 8 > 0.
Proof: This follows from Theorems 1 and 2 and the fact that open sets have positive
measure.
Example 1: A complex economy
We now construct a general equilibrium economy E as defined in Section 4. There are
1 = 3 types of households, H of each, three goods, N = 3, and two states of individual risk for
each household, S = { 1, 2}. Assume that for each i and all s, individual risk is defined by p.
= 0.5, and that individual risks are identical and independently distributed random variables. H
is assumed to be even so that H/2 is an integer and there exist collective states with r. = 0.5.
lo
The utilities of the agents are:
s=l 1S s
where U1 is state independent and Cobb - Douglas (the same for all s), x1 is consumption of
oil
good n by the ith type of households in state s and x1 = (x1^)- Endowments of households of
1 3
type 1 and 3 are state independent; they are denoted e = (0,1,0) and e = (1,0,0). Type 2
households have different endowments in state 2, the unfavorable state, than in state 1, the
2 2 H
favorable state: e ~ =(0,0,0) and e , = (0,0,2). This implies that there are 2 collective states
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3Hin Q. (rather than 2 ), because only agents of type 2 face individual risk. There are A = H+l
aggregate collective states r in R, each identified by the number of agents of type 2 who are in
state 2. When consumption of good m is state independent it is denoted x1 . The utilities of
type i households U1: R -» R are:
U1 =41nx11 + l n x ! 2
U2 = l/2(41n x2 +ln x 2 ~ ) + 1/2(4 \nx200 + In x2 ~)
7. 'I ^
U =41nx
 3 + l n x ^
The market is incomplete so far because there are no assets to deal with the risk faced
by the second type of household.
An ALM asset is now introduced, i.e. a set of transfers across different states with
expected value equal to zero. We now compute an equilibrium of this economy, as defined in
Section 4. Let p = (p^p^ipo) anc* assume that good 3 is the numeraire, p 3 = 1. Type 2 wants to
purchase insurance offered by the insurer, called agent type 0: type 2 pays q units of the
numeraire (good 3) in both states and receives 1 unit of good 3 in the unfavourable state (s =
2), q is the insurance premium for each unit of this contract. \i is the amount of insurance
contract purchased by type 2. Both q and \i are determined endogenously. Type 0 is risk
neutral, it only has utility for good 3, and it offers an insurance contract that is actuarially fair,
i. e. q = p 2 = 1/2, with zero expected value (either due to competition or regulatory
2
constraint). Type 2 agents maximize their utility U subject to
2 2
p~x
 1 ~ + x 1 ~ = 2 - q / i , s = l
2 2




1 2 = (4/5)(2 -
and jLX = 1/q.




•• Q — X rto
Type 1 household maximizes
and x | = 0.
U1 =41nx 1 1 + l n x 1 2
1 1 !
subject to p.x * + Pox 2 + P 3 X 3 = P2*
So the demand of type 1 household is:




1 = 1/5, x 3 2 = 0, x 3 3 = 4 P l /5p 3
Since type 0 (insurer) has no need to trade, there is a unique price equilibrium p*:
* * *
p l = p 2 = p 3 = L
The equilibrium consumption vectors are:
x
1
* = (4/5,1/5,0), x2* = (0,4/5,1/5) , x3* = (1/5,0,4/5)





 - e1 = (4/5,-4/5,0), z2* = (0,4/5,-4/5), z3* = (-4/5,0,4/5).
Now we define the benchmark economy E* as in Section 4: for all i and s, r°°. = p. =
1/2, n°°(roo)= 1. E * has only one aggregate collective state with non - zero probability, r°°; in
*
this state 50% of the individuals of type 2 are in state 1, and 50% in state 2. Note that E has
the same unique equilibrium as computed above, there is no default in E and the equilibrium
excess demand is zero almost surely.
To see that E is complex we refer to the proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix B. The
endowments and preference in this economy correspond to those of the economy in the proof
of Theorem 2: for each good there is only one type of household who is a net importer and
only one type of household who is a net exporter. This economy with an ALM insurance
contract is thus complex. •
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Example 2 studies default in the economy of Example 1, and analyses its complexity.
2: Default equilibrium in the complex economy E
After the insurance contract is introduced in the economy of Example 1, and
overpayment or underpayment to the insurer occurs, new state contingent prices and
allocations emerge. We compute these now.
Recall that the total number of aggregate states in the perfect foresight equilibrium is
V+l, one for the no - default state and V default states with V = H/2 if H is even and V =
(H+l)/2 if H is odd. In terms of the notation of Examplea 1, p~ = 1/2 (s=l,2), v1 = -1 if s =
1, and v1 = 1 if s = 2 and type i = 2. r e F (insurance default state) if r = <pH and (p > 1/2 .
For r G F, p satisfies p
 1 = p 0 = 2(1- <p), p ^ = 1. Recall that default is denoted 8 ; 5 = 0
if
 S = 1, 8 = -1 +(l-<p)/<p < 0 if s = 2.
Type 2 agents purchase full insurance as in Example 1. After the realization of
TT
individual state (s = 1,2) for type 2, there are 2 collective states and A = H +1 aggregate
collective states, indexed by r = 0,..,(jpH,..,H, i.e. by the number of type 2 agents in the
unfavourable state 2.
When r = <pH, <p > 1/2, and s = 2, the payment from the insurer is only (l-(p)/(p < 1 (due
to the limited liability provision). This is a default state, r e F. If s= 1, type 2's endowment is
(0,0,1) for (l-(p )H of them; for the same case but when s = 2, type 2's endowment is
2(O,O,(l-<p)/<p) for <pH of them. Given these endowments, type 2 agent's maximize utility U and
we derive type 2's demand:
(1 -cp)H of type 2's demand is x ^ = 0, x 2 2 = (4/5)(l/p2), x 2 3 = 1/5
and excess demand is (0,4/5p2,-4/5)
2 2 2
<pH of type 2's demand is x , = 0, x
 2 = (4/5p2)(l-<p)/<p, x \ = (l/5)(l-<p)/<p
and excess demand is (0,(4/5p2)(l-<jP)/<p, (-4/5)(l-<p)/(p)
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Type l's excess demand is ((4p2/5p A(-4/5),0), H of them
Type 3's excess demand is ((4/5),0,(4/5)pA H of them
Market clearing conditions are:
Good 1: (4p2/5px) H - 4H/5 = 0 -»px = p 2
Good 2: (l-<p)H4/5p2 + (4H/5p2)(l-<p) - 4H/5 = 0 -4 p 2 = 2(l-<p) < 1
Good 3: (-4/5)(l-<pH - (4/5)(I-<p)H + (4/5)p1 = 0 -4 pj = 2(l-<p) < 1
The recontrated equilibrium price vector for the aggregate collective state with default (r =
<pH, (p> 1/2) is pj = p 2 = 2(l-<p), p 3 = 1.
Equilibrium consumption vectors are
x = (4/5,1/5,0) (same as in Example 1, not affected by default)
2
x = (0, 4/10<p, (l/5)(l-<p))/<p) for <pH of them (less consumption)
and = (0, 4/10(l-(jp),l/5) for (l-<p)H of them (more consumption)
x
3
 =(1/5,0 ,(4/5)2(1 -9)) (less consumption)
Note that the market clears: sum of all demand equals (H,H,2(l-<p)H) which is the total supply
of commodities and x°= (0,0,0) for the insurer. The equilibrium prices for aggregate collective
2
state without default ( r=<pH, <p < 1/2, e = (0,0,1) always
Type l's demand is x ,= 4p2/5p*, x 2= 1/5, x - = 0
2 2 2Type 2's demand is x ~= 0, x
 2 = 4/5p2, x ~ = 1/5
3 3 3
Type 3's demand is x ,= 1/5, x
 2 = 0, x « = 4p,/5
Now type 0 receives (l-<p)H of good 3 and pays out <pH only, so it has a surplus of (l-2<jp)H >
0 of good 3. Since by assumption, agent 0's utility is a function of good 3 only, all the surplus
(1 -2<p)H is consumed directly in good 3, and this agent's excess demand is the zero vector.
33
Market clearing conditions are:
Good 1: 4p2H/5p1 - 4H/5 = 0 -+ p 1 = p 2
Good 2: -4H/5 + 4H/5p2 = 0 -• p 2 = 1
Good 3: -4H/5 + 4pjH/5 -» pj = 1
* * *




 = (4/5, 1/5, 0)
x
2




 = (1/5, 0.4/5)
x° = (0,0,(l-2<p)H)
Note that markets clear the sum of all demand vectors equals the total supply of commodities.
6. Financial Reserves and Asymptotic Risk
Consider now the economy E defined in Section 4, which we now shall denote also Err
in order to highlight the number of its individuals, H. In order to study the asymptotic
properties of this economy, we shall analyse a sequence of economies ETT as the number of
individuals tends to infinity, i.e. H -• °° . In view of the assumption of individual risk, the
probabilities over collective states satisfy FLr -» n°°, where n°° is a distribution supported on a
single point, a known proportion of each type in each state. Recall that at the limit, i.e for H =
co, E°° coincides with EM°°, the Malinvaud economy with infinite agents defined in 3.c. In
particular, when actuarially fair insurance contracts exists for each type i=l,...,I, the economy
E is always a complete economy with no default.
In order to study the asymptotic behavior of economies where assets are valued in
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terms of statistics, (i.e. ALM assets) we now need a few definitions.
Recall that the set VTT represents all states of default in the economy ETT, and ^^(VXT)
its measure, and that convergence of probabilities means weak convergence (Billingsley, 1968).
Consider an economic statistic on an endogenous risk, such for example the expected value of
total default of the economy ETT, or the expected value of per - capital default of ETT.
Formally, an endogenous economic statistic is defined as a continuous function from the space
(FTTX£TT) of all probability distributions on the space of collective states RTT times the space of
economies ETT, into the real numbers, R, i.e. S(P,ETT) e R for P3TT e FTTX£TT. Notice that an
endogenous economic statistic is defined continuously for probability distributions and
economies with a population of a fixed size H.
Now consider as in Section 3 the product of the (S -1) - dimensional unit simplex with
itself I times, denoted A . A point in A represents a proportion of each type i=l,...,I in each of
the S individual states. Then a probability measure FLr on RTT defines a measure on A ,
supported on a finite subset of A , given say by a density function FUrO*) for r € RTT, as
represented in Figure 2 below, see also Malinvaud (1973):
Figure 2 about here
As already mentioned, the assumption of individual risk in Section 3, implies lim™ (FLr) =
n°°, a degenerate measure on A supported in one point only, denoted r°°. Note that even if the
endogenous economic statistic S(P,ETT) is a continuous function of p € FJT for a fixed
population size H, convergence in measure of the probabilities ELr need not imply that
limT_Ts(nTT,ET_T) = s(n°°,E00), since the value of the endogenous statistic s depends on the
behavior of the economy Eyr as well as on the probabilities IITT.
Definition: When lim^ S^TT) ^ s(n°°), we say that there exists a "discontinuity at infinity"
for the endogenous economic statistic s.
Proposition 3,and examples 4,and 5 below provide robust examples of economies with
individual risk in which the various statistics related to the expected level of default have a
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discontinuity at infinity. In other words, although sCII^E00) = 0, lim^r S(IITT,ETT) * 0. For
example the expected default per capita statistic SCIITT^TT) may grow with H even though once
at the limit s(rr,E°°) = 0.
A natural question is whether default may be avoided by requiring that the agents hold
their positive profits from favourable collective states in reserve and use these reserves to
satisfy claims in unfavourable collective states. However, unless reserves which equal the
maximum exposure are required, the problem of default emerges all the same and leads to the
same consequences. The only difference is in the probability of default which is typically
decreased. This provides support to policies requiring some forms of reserves in te insurance
and banking industry and in financial markets, which can enhance the financial stability of the
economy.
Yet asymptotically, even with these decreased probabilities the "discontinuity at
infinity" may emerge, as shown in the following propositions. We shall argue that since
requiring reserves equal to the maximum possible exposure is not a realistic assumption, the
problem of default still emerges when reserves are required.
In order to formalize the problem with reserves within the same frmework as above, the
commodity space R in the definition of the economy E is now assumed to include time
dependent commodities, and we may assume that the excess (positive) returns on insurance
premia over payments are saved as "reserves", and used to cover the (negative) shortfalls in the
unfavorable collective states. With time indexed commodities, borrowing and lending on the
reserves is possible in successive years, with the maximum permitted length of such a contract
being, for example, Y years. If the distribution of collective states a in T is perfectly
symmetric on aggregate collective states, then this will yield good coverage against default in
the limit, i.e. as Y = ». However, for any finite period Y there will still exist collective states
with small probability in which the insurance contracts must default. All such collective states
constitute the default states with reserves. Therefore our analysis can still be applied if we use
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the set of default states with reserves instead of the set V of default states, except that the
probabilities of the default states decrease. Yet, depending on the complexity of the economy
and on the implied correlation of risks, it is possible, as we show in the following results, that
the per capita level of default will increase without bound as the population increases.
In the following, if {b } is a sequence of real numbers we say that {b } = O(lnH) if
liiriTT [b /lnH] = °°. A class of economies is called robust when it is an open set in the
topology on the space of all economies defined in Section 5. If the class of economies has
variable population H= 1,2,..., then we say that the class is robust when it is an open set under
the topology defined in Section 5 for each population size H.
The following result considers a class of economies of population size H and of
complexity H, such as the complex economies illustrated in Figure 3 below. As H increases,
the number of agents and of goods increases with H:
Proposition 3: Consider a sequence of increasingly large and complex economies K,* with a
population of H individuals facing individual risk. H -» <» and satisfying IlyT^ VTT^  = OflnH).
Then the expected value of default increases with the size of the population K The result is
robust as it holds for an open set of economies,
Proof: In Appendix B.
The following result considers a class of economies Err in which the number of agents
increases, the number of goods remains constant or increses; the per capita endowment of each
agent need not increase.
flpe 3: There exists a robust class of economies, in which autarky occurs in states of
default, for all population levels.
Consider an economy ETT with H. households of type i, i=l,...,I, a total population of LH. = H.
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There are N > 1 goods. One type, type 1, faces uncertainty: the households of type i can be in
one of two individual states S = {0,1}. The unfavorable state is 1, and 0 is the favorable state.
The endowments of households of type 1 are (0,...,0) e R in the unfavourable state and
(l,0,...,0) in the favourable state where the first good is the numeraire. Assume that the
distribution of risks over aggregate collective states for households of type 1 is given by a
probability distribution n H defined by nH(l , . . . , l) = 1/(2 ln.H); nH(l,...,l,0,...,0)= n R {1/2 R{
in state 1 and 1/2 H. in state 0} = l/(2.1n H); and nH(0,...,0) = 1 - (1/ln H). For all other
aggregate collective states r, I~ITT (r) = 0. The individual probabilities for households of type 1
are pQ = 1/(4 lnH) + (1 - 1/lnH) = (4 lnH - 3)/(4 In H), and pj= l/(21nH) + 1/(4 lnH) = 3/(4
lnH), so that p + p-. = 1. Then the probabilities FLr -» n°° weakly, where n°° is the probability
measure which assigns measure 1 to the aggregate collective state r°° where everyone of type i
is in the favorable state s= 0, i.e. r°°. = 1 if s = 0, r°°. = 0 if s =1 (i = 1). Therefore the
conditions for individual risk are satisfied. Individuals of type 1 purchase actuarially fair
insurance to equate consumption in the two states: they contract to pay a premium pi in state
0 and receive a payment p 0 in state 1. For any finite H, there is one aggregate collective state
of insurance default, denoted TTT, which occurs with probability l/(2.1nH): when all households
of type 1 are in state 1. The probability of r^ goes to 0 with H. Assume now that the economy
EJT is complex, as in the example of Section 5 and as illustrated in Figure 3; it has a unique
equilibrium in which there is one type which is a net importer of each good, and one type
which is a net exporter of each good. At the equilibrium prices of ETT all the households of
type 1 have zero endowments and trade nothing in the default state; by construction, no - one
else will trade in this state either, leading to autarky. Therefore as H increases, the economy is
always in autarky in the default state r^r. This example is robust for small changes in initial
endowments and preferences, since the net trades at equilibrium are a continuous fuction of
endowments and preferences in the chosen topology. •
The following result considers economies in which the number of agents and the their
initial endowments increases:
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Example 4: There exists a robust class of econonijcs with individual risk where the expected
value of per capita default increases with the population
Consider an economy E^ with H. households of type i, i=l,...,I, a total population of LH. = H.
There are N > 1 goods. One type, type 1 faces uncertainty: the households of type i can be in
one of two individual states S = {0,1}- The unfavorable state is 1, and 0 is the favorable state.
NThe endowments of households of type i are (0,...,0) € R in the unfavourable state and
(H,0,...,0) in the favourable state where the first good is the numeraire. Assume that the
distribution of risks over aggregate collective states for households of type 1 is given by a
probability distribution n R defined by nH(l , . . . , l) = 1/(2 ln.H); IIH(l,...,l,0,...,0)= n R {1/2 H.
in state 1 and 1/2 H. in state 0} = l/(2.1n H); and nR(0,...,0) = 1 - (1/ln H). For all other
aggregate collective states r, IITT (r) = 0. The individual probabilities for households of type 1
are pQ = 1/(4 lnH) + (1 - 1/lnH) = (4 lnH - 3)/(4 In H), and p t = l/(21nH) + 1/(4 lnH) = 3/(4
lnH), so that P o + Pi = 1- Then the probabilities IVr -» n°° weakly, where n°° is the probability
CO
measure which assigns measure 1 to the aggregate collective state r where everyone of type i
is in the favorable state s= 0, i.e. r°°. = 1 if s = 0, r°°. = 0 if s =1 (i = 1). Therefore the
is is
conditions for individual risk are satisfied. Individuals of type 1 purchase actuarially fair
insurance to equate consumption in the two states: they contract to pay a premium p*H in state
0 and receive a payment p^H in state 1. For any finite H, there is one aggregate collective
state of insurance default, denoted rH, which occurs with probability l/(2.1nH): when all
households of type 1 are in state 1. This aggregate collective state will be used to derive a
lower bound for the per - capita default of this economy as H increases. The probability of rxr
goes to 0 with H. Assume now that the economy ETT is complex, as in the example of Section
5 and as indicated in Figure 3, having a unique equilibrium in which there is one type which is
a net importer of each good, and one type which is a net exporter of each good. At the
equilibrium prices of ETT the default of the insurer in collective state equals PQH^H units of
the numeraire.units of the numeraire defaulted in collective state TTT, and, in per-capital terms,
to PQH, units of the numeraire. Therefore as H increases, the expected level of per - capita
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default is pQFL(l/21nH) which goes to infinity since H, is a fixed fraction of H. Note that this
example is robust for small changes in initial endowments and preferences, since the net trades
at equilibrium are a continuous fuction of endowments and preferences in the chosen topology.
7. Conclusion
We have analyzed the effect of introducing ALM assets in a lrage but finite economy
to hedge against individual risk. Examples of ALM assets are actuarially fair insurance
contracts, or shares in a firm which maximizes expected profits. An economy E with
incomplete markets was defined in which states of default emerge to account for the fact that
ALM assets promise deliveries that can sometimes exceed physical endowments. Theorem 1
proved the existence of an equilibrium with incomplete markets and endogenous uncertainty
on the contract's default. The new states of default in E are collective states because they
depend on collective events, such as the proportion of the population in each individual state.
In complex economies, furthermore, many individuals default at once at each state of default,
emphasizing the collective nature of default. Theorem 2 shows that there is an open set of
complex economies of complexity k, for any k > 2. In such economies default by one
individual leads to default by k individuals, due to the pattern of trading. The introduction of
ALM assets to hedge against individual risk therefore may increase collective risk (of default).
We studied the asymptotic properties of risk, namely the level of expected default as
the population size increases towards infinity. At the limit, and only at the limit all the
economies considered here have no default. This is because the distribution of risks across the
population converges with certainty to a known quantity. However, matters are quite different
before the limit is reached. Indeed, there might be a "discontinuity at infinity" measured by the
fact that an economic statistic depending on endogenous risk (of default) increases beyond
limit as the population goes to infinity even though at the limit there is no default.
Propositions 3, Examples 3 and 4 show that there are robust classses of economies
where there is a "discontinuity at infinity", in the sense that although in the limiting case
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(infinite populations) there is no default, yet the expected default increases with the population.
Furthermore we show that the economy goes into autarky in states of default at all population
levels no matter how large, and the per capital level of default increases with the population as
well.
Our results illustrate a familiar concern about financial innovation. The concern is that
the introduction of new financial assets can lead to more instability, namely to new states of
collective default. The results we presented formalize this concern. They could also offer a
way to measure the benefits of financial innovation, as well as its drawbacks.
The key is to understand the two circumstances under which collective risk increases
following the introduction of new financial assets. These circumstances are: the assets are
ALM, and the economies are complex. The first feature of the problem, that the assets be
ALM, is almost inevitable in large economies with individual risk, because of the difficulty
inherent to assets which depend on long list of individual characteristics, most of which are
difficult to observe. So this first condition cannot be easily avoided. The second feature refers
to the complexity of the economy. Here our results could be used to study the impact of
financial innovation. The introduction of an asset will typically increase the web of trading in
an economy and thus can be generally expected to increase its complexity. However, certain
assets will increase the collective risk of default, and the total expected default, more than
others. They create "correlated" risks which cannot be properly insured. The computation of
the collective risk of default and the total expected default from different assets, as defined in
Section 3, could help to determine the extent of collective risk introduced by the asset.
One generally expects that a new asset will increase the efficiency of the economy by
improving the allocation of risks across favourable and unfavourable states, and thus lead to
Pareto improvements. An interesting area of research would include the computation of the
costs and benefits from the introduction of new securities. The benefits can be measured in
terms of Pareto improvements in welfare, and the costs could be measured in terms of the
increase is collective risks.
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One implication of our results is that they formalize a "multiplier effect" for policy. In
a complex economy, financial policies which succeed in preventing default by one agent also
prevent, by a chain reaction, a large number of other defaults at no additional cost. Therefore
the benefits have a "multiplier effect". Our results provide support for the policy of requiring
reserves to enhance financial stability.
It should be noted that the relevant measurement of financial instability could in some
cases be the total expected default, rather than the quantity of defaults following a given
default. The complexity of the economy is not a problem in itself, unless it leads to large
correlated risks.
If after the introduction of an ALM asset a second layer of securities is introduced to
deal with the endogenous risk created by the first, and the latter securities are also of the ALM
type, then the process is replicated. More endogenous uncertainty is created, piling up the risk
of default of an asset which was introduced to hedge against the risk of default of another.
More securities are needed at each point in this sequence to complete the market. These results
also suggest that large and complex market economies with individual risks are likely to be
incomplete. If as economies grow in size they develop more trading complexity, they can
become more vulnerable to the collective risks arising from financial innovation.
8. Appendix
Part A. The Utility Function of Households
The von - Neuman Morgenstem utility function can be written as:
5
i N+
z , e R indicating that the h household of type i has preferences on consumption which
may be represented by a "state separated" utility function U1 defined from S elementary utility
functions U1 . The functions U1 are assumed to be C , strictly increasing, strictly quasi
s s
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concave, and the closure of the indifference surfaces {(U1)" (x)} c int(R ) for all x e R .
s
We consider, like Malinvaud (1973), an important class of cases in which the activity of the
household h depends on <7 only through the aggegate collective state r(o). If household h takes
into account first what happens to her or him i.e. s = s(h,o), and second which frequency
distribution r(a) happens to appear, but nothing else, then the consumption plan z _ =
y1 ,, rrt(r(°))- The summation with respect to collective states a can now be made first with
respect to each aggregate collective state. To a particular r and s for which r * 0, there usually
s
corresponds a number of a leading to r(a) = r and s(h,o) = s, hence to the same U - / u ^ z u _)
= U1 (y1 (r)). Hence W may also be written as
o 3
(A.2) WV) = X n(r) Z r . U1 (y1 (r)),
reRR s=l 1S s s
which depends on the type i but not on the household h. But if we make the further assumption
that the household h only takes into account what happens to him/her, then the utility function
of the i-th type of household in (A.I) can be rewritten as
S
KA.V W (Z ) - _ . i s _ §v_ §/
where z e R is the consumption of a household of type i in individual state s (Malinvaud
(1973), p 390, (12)). Clearly z. = z1 if individual h is of type i, and is in individual state s at
the collective state a.
Appendix Part B: Proofs of results
The economy in Theorem 1 has incomplete asset markets. Each asset has exogenously
determined and fixed yields denominated in terms of the numeraire good. The economy has
restricted access, because each type of agent can only purchase one of the assets available in
the economy (i.e. the insurance contract of type i). The proof of existence of equilibrium in
such an economy (e.g. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, 1986, Chichilnisky and Heal, 1991) is
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standard. The first part of the proof consists of verifying that Walras Law is satisfied in the
model of Theorem 1; it suffices to prove this for the case where the penalty for the insurer c =
0; the same proof follows for any given c < 0:
Lemma 1. Walras Law is satisfied in the econmy of Theorem 1, i.e.
I S
p r . I I H. r. (y* - e1 ) = 0, for r = 0,l,...,V.
r
 i=0 s=l l 1S s r s
Proof:
N N
Let A = { p € R _ : I _ j p =1} be the price simplex for the aggregate collective
state r = 0,...,V. After we find the equilibrium price p* e A with p* > 0, we can renormalize
r rn
to make p* = 1 for the numeraire good. Let the price simplex be denoted A = A x...,Ay
rn
V
= X A . In the aggregate collective state r, the total insurance payments to all individual
r=0 r
agents of type i = 1,...,I is
I S
(B.I) T = I I H.r. v1 r = 0,l,...,V.
r
 i=l
 s=l 1 1S s
where r is the proportion of type i agents in state s given the aggregate collective state r. If
is
S •
r- = p. for i = 1,...,I and s = 1,...,S, then we know that T = 0 from I
 1 p. v = 0
(actuarially fair insurance). Otherwise T * 0. If T_ < 0 there is no default and the insurer (i =
0) has net income -TQ to be spent on consumption goods in state r = 0. If T > 0, the insurer
has to default and consume nothing (the insurer has zero endowment, e = 0) with the
provision of limited liability which corresponds to the default state r = 1,...,V. The shortfalls
8 are chosen then to satisfy the provision of limited liability:
I S
(B.2) I I H.r. (v1 + 8\) = 0 forr=l, . . . ,V,
i=l
 s=l 11S s s r
(B.3a) (a) If v\ < 0, then 8\r = 0
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(B.3b) (b) If v1 > 0, then S\r < 0, and 8\r + v\ > 0.
(B.3a) means that there is no shortfall when the insurer does not pay in state s. (B3b) means
that shortfalls happen only when the insurer is supposed to pay according to the actuarially fair
insurance contract, and the shortfalls cannot exceed the originally promised payment. Now we
can state and prove the Walras' Law in our economy.
For r = 0, and i = 1,...,I, p (y1 - e1 ) = v1 , from the budget constraint and 81 - 0.
r sr s s sr
is . .
For r = 0 and i = 0 (insurer), p r(y° r - e°) = p^T = -TQ. Hence p r. I i = Q Z s=1 H ^ y s r - e s) =
1
 S^ l ^ V ' s " To = ° from ^ and Ho = l- ros = h For r = 1--V ' Pr • ^ s r " e V = v
+ 8 from the budget constraint. Summing over i and s we have
IS IS
Pr • I i = 0 I s = 1 H j r ^ - c ^ = I i = 1 I s = 1 Hfris (v\ + 8^ = 0
from (B.2), for r = 1,...,V. •
Proof of Theorem 1
Since W1(y1) is additively separable across r and s, an equilibrium can be represented as a pair
(p,y) with p = (pr), r = 0,...,V, p f E Ar, and y e R I N S < V + 1 ) , such that:
(B4) y = (y1 J , y1 is in the demand correspondence D1 (p ) = {y1 e R : y1 maximizes
dX oX oX X J^ X dX
u l (y \ r ) within B1 (pj},
oX oX X
where
i i N i i i i
(B5) B
 sr(p) is the budget set {y e R :Pr-(v s r "e s) = v s + ^ s r) for s = ^ - t S , r = 0,...V,
and markets clear:
IS . .
(B6) 0 e $r(vJ t n e excess demand correspondence I- n I - i H- r. (D (p ) - {e })
X X ±~~\J X ^ X. X X o oX I 5>
for r = 0,...,V.
For each r the budget set B1 (p j defines a non empty, compact, convex valued and
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continuous correspondence, so that § (p ) is a non empty, convex - valued and upper
hemicontinuous correspondence (Berge's theorem). Furthermore, the excess demand
correspondence (j) satisfies Walras1 Law for each r (Lemma 1), and the Boundary condition of
Debreu (1982, p. 722). Therefore all the conditions of Theorem 8 of Debreu (1982, p. 722) are
satisfied so that there exists a p* such that 0 e $r(p*J- The vector p* = (p* ) and the
corresponding allocation y*(p) is an equilibrium, completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2:
This proof has two steps: in the first step we construct an example of a complex
economy, E. In the second step we show that small variations of endowments and utilities
from those of E will remain within the class of complex economies. This latter step uses
Smale's (1974) results which establish that for a generic (open and dense) set of economies,
the equilibrium allocations and prices depend locally continuously on the initial endowments
and preferences. We construct a complex economy in steps.
First consider the case N = H. Let E be an economy with N goods, H households, and
equilibrium prices p*, where at the equilibrium allocation corresponding to p*, household 1 is
the only net exporter of good 1, and the only net importer of good 2; household 2 is the only
net exporter of good 2 and the only net importer of good 3, etc., finally household H is the
only net exporter of good N, and the only net importer of good 1. Note that E is complex, for
any default of any amount initiated by any of the households in any commodity n = 1,...,H.
The argument is now extended to N = H + b, b < H. It suffices to modify E as follows.
Assume that household 1 is the only net exporter of goods 1 and H+l, and the only net
importer of goods 2 and H+2; household 2 is the only net exporter of goods 2 and H+2; etc.,
household b is the only net exporter of goods b and H+b and the only net importer of goods
b+1 and 1; and finally household H is the only exporter of good H and importer of good H+l.
The economy E, thus defined is clearly complex. Finally consider the general case of an
economy E, where N = aH+b, b < N, for some a > 0. Define i mod H as the set of all natural
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numbers n > H such that i is the remainder from dividing n into H, i.e. such that i satisfies n =
aH+i, for some a > 0. Then define the economy E so that household 1 is the only net importer
of all goods 1 mod H and the only net exporter of all goods 2 mod H; household 2 is the only
net exporter of all goods 2 mod H and importer of all goods 3 mod H; etc.; finally H is the
only net exporter of all goods 0 mod H and net importer of all goods 1 mod H. E is clearly
complex, see Figure 3.
Figure 3 here
Such an economy E arises by assigning to household i an endowment consisting
exclusively of goods i mod H, a utility function with no utility for good i mod H, and the sum
of Cobb - Douglas utilities for goods i+1 mod H. Example 1 in Section 5 illustrates such an
economy. Finally note that the complexity of E survives small variations in net trades at the
equilibrium. To see that the economy remains complex for small variations in net trades
consider the following modification of the economy E O1 Consider first the case N = H.
Assume that p* = (1,...,1) - this can always be assumed without loss of generality by changing
the commodities' units of measurement. Now consumer 1 is no longer the only net importer of
good 1, but the main one: consumer 1 is a net importer of one unit of good 1 (in terms of the
numeraire), while all other consumers together import less than E at the equilibrium, E < 1/2H.
Similarly consumer 1 is a net exporter of one unit of good 2, while all other consumers
together export less than 1/2H of good 2, etc., until consumer H who is a net importer of 1 unit
of good 1, while the rest of all consumers import at most 1/2H units of good H; and finally H
exports one unit of good 1, while all other consumers together export at most 1/2H units of
good 1. Then any default of at least one unit of good n, n = 1,...,H, leads to default by all H
individuals. A small enough modification of endowments and preferences of produces another
complex economy. The same argument can be employed to show that for small variations of
endowments and utilities the economy E with N = aH + b, a > 0, b < H, remains complex.
Therefore, E may be modified so as to be within Smale's (1974) open and sense class of
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economies in which net trades vary (locally) continuously with initial endowments and
utilities, and remain complex. Any further small modification will still remain within the class
of complex economies, proving that there exists an open class of complex economies.
To prove that k - complexity is an open property when N > H, construct an economy E
where k individuals replicate economy E of Theorem 1, for k goods. Assume all other
individuals have zero net trades at the equilibrium p*. Then default can only be initiated by
one of k individuals, and leads to k - 1 other defaults. This example is open since for any level
of default 8 > 0, we can modify the original economy so that the net trades of the households h
= k+l,...,H add up to less than 8. •
Proof of Proposition 3
This follows from Theorem 1 and the results of Section 5. In complex economies such as E~
in Theorem 1, default always increases at least as a linear function of the population H, while
the definition of individual risk is consistent with an arbitrary rate of convergence of the
probabilities FLr as H -+ «, as it requires only weak convergence of the probabilitiy measures
nH-4 n°°, see e.g. Malinvaud (1973), p. 387, para 4.
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f R i s k
I n d i v i d u a l C o l l e c t i v e
E x o g e n o u s
E n d o q e n o u s
A s s e t s i n t r o d u c e d t o h e d g e i n d i v i d u a l r i s k i n c r e a s e c o l l e
r i s k .
F i g u r e 1
F i g u r e 2
T h e s h a d e d a r e a c o n t a i n s t h e s u p p o r t o f t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n
o v e r c o l l e c t i v e s t a t e s i n t h e f i n i t e e c o n o m y ; t h e p o i ' n t
i n s i d e i t i n d i c a t e s t h e s u p p o r t o f t h e l i m i t i n g d i s t r i b u t i o n
w h i c h i s a p o i n t b e c a u s e o f t h e a s s u m p t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l r i s k
Figure 3
imports 2 mod K exports 3 rod H
exports 2 roc H
irrports lircdH
iirports 2 rod H
experts 4 mod K
The complex econanv E of Theorem 2. Household 1 i s the only net imoorter
of a l l ooods 1 rod H, and the onlv net exoorter o f a l l aoods 2 mod H.
There are H households and N goods, N$H.
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